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Contents Guest Editorial: Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, Günther G. Schulze,: What Can We Know About Corruption? A Very Short History of Corruption Research and a List of What We Should Aim For JBNST - Vol. 235/2 - 2015, pp. 100-114.
Original Papers De Rosa, Donato, Nishaal Gooroochurn, Holger Görg,: Corruption and Productivity: Firm-level Evidence JBNST - Vol. 235/2 - 2015, pp. 115-138.
+ show abstract- hide abstractUsing enterprise data for the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS, this study
examines the effects of corruption on productivity. Corruption is narrowly defined as the occurrence
of informal payments to government officials to ease the day-to-day operation of firms.
The effects of this “bribe tax” on productivity are compared to the consequences of red tape,
which may be understood as imposing a “time tax” on firms. When testing effects in the full
sample, only the bribe tax appears to have a negative impact on firm-level productivity, while the
effect of the time tax is insignificant. We also find that the surrounding environment influences
the way in which firm behaviour affects firm performance. In particular, in countries where
corruption is more prevalent and the legal framework is weaker, bribery is more harmful for
firm-level productivity. Ivlevs, Artjoms, Timothy Hinks: Bribing Behaviour and Sample Selection: Evidence from Post-Socialist Countries and Western Europe JBNST - Vol. 235/2 - 2015, pp. 139-167.
+ show abstract- hide abstractWe study the individual-level determinants of bribing public officials. Particular attention is paid
to the issue of respondents’ non-random selection into contact with public officials, which may
result in biased estimates. Data come from the 2010 Life in Transition Survey, covering 30
post-socialist and five Western European countries. The results suggest that the elderly tend
to be less likely to bribe public officials, while people with higher income and, especially, low
trust in public institutions are more likely to bribe. Several determinants of bribery – ethnic
minority status, the degree of urbanisation, social trust – are context specific, i.e. they change
signs or are statistically significant according to the geographical region or the type of public
official. The results show that not accounting for sample selection effects may produce a bias
in estimated coefficients. Liu, Qijun, Yaping Peng: Determinants of Willingness to Bribe: Micro Evidence from the Educational Sector in China JBNST - Vol. 235/2 - 2015, pp. 168-183.
+ show abstract- hide abstractWe use a unique dataset based on reported direct personal bribes paid by arts students in China
at examinations and in the college admissions process to study willingness to bribe. We find that
individual willingness to bribe depends on personal characteristics rather than on the attributes
of the admissions process at different colleges and universities. The perceived level of corruption,
personal attitudes towards corruption, academic attainment, and the rank of a college are
significant predictors of bribery. Based on self-reporting, students from middle-income families
have a higher likelihood of engaging in bribery than students from poor or rich families. There
are no significant gender differences in bribing behavior. We acknowledge and seek to account
for the possibility of identity-confirming expressive behavior in the survey responses. Gouda, Moamen, Sang-Min Park: Religious Loyalty and Acceptance of Corruption JBNST - Vol. 235/2 - 2015, pp. 184-206.
+ show abstract- hide abstractThis study investigates the relationship between religiously-induced internalized values of individuals
and their specific attitudes regarding the acceptance of corruption. The dataset on which
our study is based was collected by the World Values Survey from 141,326 individuals in 78
countries surveyed during a period of 13 years. We propose that individual attitudes towards
corruption and religion are associated given certain societal and institutional contexts. Our
results show that although there is a negative and statistically significant effect of religiosity on
the acceptance of corruption on the individual level, this effect is small. We find that there is
a threshold value of religiosity below which corruption is more easily accepted by individuals.
Our interpretation for this result is simple: individuals with minimal religiosity are generally
less constrained by religious norms; specifically, religious norms that are opposed to corruption
are less binding on these individuals, resulting in them having a greater propensity to accept
corruption. Religiosity, therefore, does lower the acceptance of corruption only when it exceeds
a certain threshold for a specific individual. : Group Decision Making in a Corruption Experiment: China and Germany Compared JBNST - Vol. 235/2 - 2015, pp. 207-227.
+ show abstract- hide abstractMuch hope is put into the ‘‘four eyes principle’’ as an anti corruption device in many countries.
However, as recent cases have shown, entire groups of decision makers can be corrupt as well.
This paper reports on an experimental investigation of individual versus group decision making
in a corruption experiment.
We find that the group decisions, as compared to individual decisions, lead to a higher level
of corruption, for bribers and for bribees, and in China as well as in Germany. Only German
women are less corrupt in a group decision context than when deciding individually.
Further differences between Germany and China with respect to the effect of the teams’ gender
composition were found. In Germany, groups that consist only of females are the most honest
and the male groups are the most corrupt, whereas in China the groups with mixed gender
combination have shown a higher inclination to make corrupt decisions than the groups that
are homogenous with respect to gender. Khachatryan, Elina, Sebastian Kube, Björn Vollan: Mitigating Extortive Corruption? Experimental Evidence JBNST - Vol. 235/2 - 2015, pp. 228-241.
+ show abstract- hide abstractExtortive petty corruption takes place when a public official elicits small bribes from citizens
for providing public services that the citizens are legally entitled to receive. We implement a
novel experimental design that mimics this phenomenon and explores bottom-up approaches
for its mitigation. In different setups we examine how monitoring by citizens affects public
official’s tendency to demand bribes and whether citizens are more willing to engage in monitoring
if they can recommend rather than report. Our results are mixed. Recommendations
seem to perform better in environments with personal and repeated interactions, where reports
might cause discontent and further disadvantaged treatment by public officials. In contrast,
reports and the sanctions these potentially cause are more likely to deter public officials from
extortive behavior in settings similar to the stranger matching protocol. Regarding citizen’s
monitoring involvement, we find a strong preference for recommendations over reports, even
among stranger matching treatments. Moreover, independent of the matching protocol and the
endogenous monitoring mechanism, we find that agents in both roles are sensitive to monitoring
and detection rate variations: public officials in their decision to demand a bribe and citizens
in their decision to monitor. |